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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade or so, "police brutality" has become a
household phrase nationwide.' Several Minnesota cases demonstrate that police misconduct exists in our own communities and
that the various remedies in place are ineffective in solving the
problem
In Kelly v. City of Minneapols,3 police misconduct intert J.D. Expected 2002, B.A. St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota.
1. David Cole, Editorial, Profiles of Shame-Police Reliance on Race as a Factor of
Suspicion Violates the First Principleof CriminalLaw: Individual Responsibility, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PREss, June 1, 1999, at 13A; John Goldman, Jury Acquits 4 Police Officers in
Diallo Killing, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12687104;
New York Brutality Victim Sues Police Department & Union, LIABILITY WEEK, Aug. 10,
1998, available at 1998 WL 12498631.
2. Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008 (D. Minn. 1998) (alleging
excessive force and arrest without probable cause for altercation with police and
subsequent arrest when plaintiff did not open the apartment building's security
door for the police); Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 659-62 (Minn.
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sects with official immunity and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IED). Kelly offered the Minnesota Supreme Court the occasion to review the scope of official immunity and the elements of
IIED, and the opportunity to take a step toward solving the problem of police misconduct.
This case note first examines the history of police misconduct,
official immunity, and IIED. Part Three details the facts and procedure of the Kelly case. Part Four analyzes both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of the Kelly decision. Finally, this
note concludes that the court legitimizes police misconduct by upholding the status quo in both areas of the law in Kelly and argues
that it is time for the court to adopt a different standard for IIED
police misconduct to remedy this serious issue.
II. HISTORY
A. Police Misconduct
Police misconduct is neither easy to recognize nor easy to define. 4 Nevertheless, police misconduct has been and continues to
1999) (alleging IIED, among other claims, for brawl with police, racist and sexist
name-calling, exposure of plaintiff's breasts, and subsequent arrests); Baker v.
Chaplin, 517 N.W.2d 911, 912 (Minn. 1994) (alleging assault, battery, and excessive force for injuries caused by officer who used a police riot baton to hit the
plaintiff when the barricade the plaintiff stood by at a demonstration fell over);
Carradine v. State of Minnesota, 511 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Minn. 1994) (alleging unreasonable search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and excessive force for stop
and arrest by police when plaintiff was on his way to the airport to catch a flight);
Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 598
N.W.2d 657, 659 (Minn. 1999) (characterizing the officers' conduct as a "disproportionate response" inflicting "gratuitous cruelty"). See also David Chanen, Police
Brutality Reports Declining in Minneapolis-But Some Say Victims Are Less Likely to Complain, STAR TRIB. (MPLS.-ST. PAUL), April 24, 2000, at lB (reporting that there were
six excessive force claims in Minneapolis in 1999); Mary Lynn Smith, St. Paul Ok's
$92,500 Settlement in Brutality Case, STAR TRIB. (MPLS.-ST. PAUL), June 17, 1999, at
2B (alleging police brutality where police handcuffed an intoxicated Native
American plaintiff, sprayed him with a chemical irritant, called him racist names,
and left him outside in the snow while wearing only a light jacket); see also infra
notes 6, 9.
3. 598 N.W.2d 657, 657 (Minn. 1999).
4.

Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, in POLICE

VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 53

(William

A. Geller & Hans Toch, eds., 1996) (noting that some did not consider the Rodney
King beating abusive); Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the
Courts, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 1275, 1276 (1999) (defining police misconduct as merely
mistaken conduct like an unlawful search or unnecessary force but police brutality
as "conduct... taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its tar-
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be a complex and pervasive problem.5 One dimension of police
target."); Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra,at 7
(suggesting that police conduct constitutes brutality only when it is unnecessary or
inappropriate and "abusive of the rights or dignity" of citizens); David S. Cohen,
Official Oppression:A HistoricalAnalysis of Low-Level PoliceAbuse and a Modern Attempt
at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 165, 168 n.12 (1996) (suggesting that police misuse of force, or excessive force, includes subcategories of deadly force, low
level brutality, verbal abuse and harassment, with verbal abuse including racial epithets and discourtesy); David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations:
The Use of FictionalNarrativesin FederalPolice Brutality Prosecutions,74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
18, 102-03 (1999) (noting that definitions of police brutality vary because its prevalence is not measured by standardized statistics but that generally it is "force that
crosses the line of objective reasonableness"). Cf, Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled
Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencingfor Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
677, 684-85 (March 1996) (noting that "[e]ven the 'obvious' cases are not obvious
to everyone.") (citing Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, A Typology of Police Deviance, in POLICE DEVIANCE 4, 7 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, eds., 1991) (defining 'police abuse of authority,' which can be physical, psychological, or legal in
form, as 'any action' by a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice
that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency in the course of performing 'police work')). In this scheme, physical abuse,
or police brutality, is synonymous with excessive force. Barker & Carter, supra, at
7. Psychological abuse includes "verbal assail[ing], ridicul[ing], discriminat[ing],
or harass[ing] individuals and/or plac[ing] a person who is under the actual or
constructive dominion of the officer in a situation where the individual's esteem
or self-image [sic] are threatened or diminished." Freeman, supra, at 685-86 (citing Barker & Carter, supra, at 7-8). But see Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and
the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of PolicePower, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra, at 130
(arguing that racial slurs and abusive language should not be classified as police
brutality because such a broad category "ultimately describes nothing usefully").
Legal abuse is the "violation of a person's constitutional, federally protected, or
state-protected rights by a police officer." Freeman, supra, at 686 (citing Barker &
Carter, supra, at 8).
5. ANTONY M. PATE & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICIAL REPORTS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 5 (1993) (noting that

"[f]ong before Lord Acton warned that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, the Romans were asking 'Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?, or
'[W]ho will guard the guards themselves?"'). From the beginning of American
history, "violence [was] ... the primary tool used by the dominant class to preserve
the order, culture and hierarchical structure of the status quo" against minority
groups. Myriam E.Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2000) (noting that a 1931
study "found extensive evidence of police misconduct and violence" in U.S. cities
and concluding that "[p]olice brutality, corruption and abuse of authority have
long presented American cities with some of their most pressing-and legally vexing - social problems."); see alsoJennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failure to Breach the
Blue Wall of Silence: The Circlingof the Wagons to ProtectPolice Perjury,39 WASHBURN L.
J. 211, 219 (2000) (noting violence first against Native Americans and later against
Mexicans, Chinese, and blacks); Cole, supranote 1, at 13A (citing the 1968 Kerner
Commission Report which discussed causes of urban riots in African Amercian
neighborhoods). Cf Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in
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misconduct, and inseparable from it, is racial prejudice and ten6
sion.
Proposals to alleviate this problem are numerous and varied.
Remedies aimed at averting future incidents of misconduct often
target the selection and training processes of potential officers or
suggest department reforms, but these preventive remedies have
had little impact on the numbers of incidences of misconduct."
POLICE VIOLENCE, supranote 4, at 250-51 (noting that the public perception is that

excessive force is a problem); see also infra note 12 and accompanying text. But see
Fred E. Inbau, Tribute, Democratic Restraints Upon the Police, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1429, 1429-30 (1999) (placing blame for historical suppression of minorities on the community rather than on the police).
Not only has the press brought incidences of police brutality into the public awareness, but scholars have decried police misconduct as a systematic problem. Bandes, supranote 4, at 1275-76 (arguing that courts' portrayal of police brutality as "anecdotal, fragmented, and isolated" influences their decisions and
causes them to "mask or discount systemic harm"). See also Christopher A. Love,
The Myth of Message-Sending: The Continuing Search for a True Deterrent to Police Misconduct, 12 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 45, 45 (1998) (characterizing the problem as one
of "widespread patterns of misconduct"); Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 149 (1998) (noting that incidents similar to the Abner
Louima case "occur with disturbing frequency across the nation"); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring
Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1993) (concluding that police abuse
"continues virtually unchecked"); Tara L. Senkel, Note, Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police: Let's HandcuffPolice Brutality, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 385,
385-86 (1999) (noting that from 1993 to 1995 complaints of excessive force by New
York City police rose more than sixty percent); Reno to Step Up Efforts to Cut Racial
Bias by Police, STAR TRIB. (MPLS.-ST. PAUL), April 16, 1999, at 17A (labeling police

brutality "a top civil rights priority").
6. Troutt, supra note 4, at 104-05 (noting "[b]lack and Latino men.. .report
higher rates of victimization at the hands of police officers[,]" and racist verbal
abuse occurs frequently).
7. Infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. Chanen, supra note 2 (explaining that statistics seem to indicate a decline
in instances of misconduct because people have quit lodging complaints); Verena
Dobnik, CoalitionAgainst Brutality Proposes 10 Major Police Reforms in NY. City, BUFFALO NEWS, MARCH 28, 1999, at A9, available at 1999 WL 4546270 (reporting that a
New York City multirace coalition proposed reforms, after Amadou Diallo's killing,
which included providing uniforms for undercover cops, recruiting more minorities and women, creating a special prosecutorial position to handle police misconduct, and setting up a complaint board); Senkel, supra note 5, at 418 (advocating
the need for reform of criminal and civil law statutes); Love, supra note 5, at 59-60
(arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which would allow the Attorney General to bring
a civil suit seeking injunctive relief from offensive police department practices, is a
possible solution to the problem); Cohen, supra note 4, at 183, 186 (proposing the
creation of the crime of official oppression to officers' "cover lower-level abuse");
Michelle A. Travis, Note, Psychological Health Tests for Violence-Prone Police Officers:
Objectives, Shortcomings, and Alternatives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1717, 1718 (1994) (proposing alternative police candidate screening tests that "focus on behavior modifi-
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Retrospective relief such as civil causes of action, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary measures have also failed in deterring police
from abusing their power because plaintiffs who suffer from police
misconduct are infrequently compensated and sentences are light.9
Refusing to address police misconduct is not a viable option as
it further alienates minorities and fuels their mistrust of the police."0 The animosity minorities feel toward police manifests itself
in turn, reinforcing the police perspective of "us versus them" and
encouraging the cycle of misconduct."
cation rather than behavior prediction"); Wayne R. LaFave, ControllingDiscretion by
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 446, 483, 502 (1990) (noting
written guidelines are a common way to structure police discretion but the "benefits [of doing so] have [not] been fully realized"); infra note 6 and accompanying
text. But see Chanen, supranote 2 (attributing a decline in excessive force cases in
Minneapolis "to better hires, improved training, consistent discipline and early
intervention").
9. Miller, supra note 5, at 149-50 (labeling the legal response to police misconduct incidents as "retrospective relief"); Chanen, supra note 2 (reporting that
in 1999, of the eighteen excessive force suits that went to trial, a plaintiff recovered
in only one case); Gilles, supra note 5, at 19-20 (concluding that criminal prosecutions, disciplinary proceedings, and Section 1983 suits have been "ineffective in
curbing pervasive police misconduct"); Senkel, supra note 5, at 413-15 (concluding
that Section 1983 fails to deter police brutality because of qualified immunity's
"unreasonable" standard and police officers' code of silence; furthermore, civilian
complaint review boards do not work); Love, supra note 5, at 45, 49, 59 (arguing
that neither civil liability nor criminal prosecution deters police misconduct);
Freeman, supra note 4, at 680 (arguing that courts should view police misconduct
"through the same lens that we view other violent crimes" and give proportional
sentences); Patton, supra note 5, at 753-54, 771 (arguing that because of problems
with bringing a Section 1983 suit-the expense to the plaintiff, the limited ability
to enjoin police practices, and the officer's superior credibility with the jurythere is "no financial impact" on police which would provide an economic incentive for police to modify their conduct and concluding that plaintiffs rarely win
(citing MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDuCr: LAw AND LITIGA-

TION § 11.3(b)(3), at 11-30 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that "[m]ost experienced lawyers handling police misconduct cases expect to lose more cases than they win,
even though the cases are well prepared and competently presented."))); Mary M.
Cheh, supranote 5, at 24748 (concluding that "[t]he criminal law is not an effec" but that
tive way to prevent excessive force or to cure systemic misbehavior .....
civil law "has the potential to serve as the instrument of systemic reform.").
10. Patton, supra note 5, at 803; see also infra note 12.
11. Cohen, supra note 4, at 170 (explaining that "a vicious causal chain forms:
abuse of discretion caused by race-and class-based animus which, in turn, causes
disrespect and further abuse of discretion and misuse of force"); see also PATE &
FRIDELL, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that "the perception of the use of excessive
force by police contributed to the Harlem disturbance of 1935, the Watts riot in
1965, the wide range of 1967 disorders studied by the Kerner Commission, the Miami riot of 1980, and several other disturbances").
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Official Immunity

Official immunity evolved with the doctrine of sovereign immunity in common law England. 12 Although the American trend
has been toward restricting or abrogating immunities, American
courts recognize official immunity to protect public officials from
potentially harassing damage suits13 when their duties require the
exercise ofjudgment or discretion.
Official immunity can be defeated only by proof that the official committed "a willful or malicious wrong."1 4 A willful or mali12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Special Note on Governmental Immunity, chapter 45A) (1977); Robert C. Cloud, QualifiedImmunity for University Administratorsand Regents, 131 ED. LAw REP. 561, 562 (1999). The doctrine of sovereign
(or governmental) immunity in English common law "reflected the medieval belief that the king.. .could do no wrong because he ruled by divine right...." Id.
Immunity extended to protect the king's servants carrying out his commands. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. a (1977); see generally Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (noting that the state or sovereign cannot be
sued in its own courts without its consent and concluding that a territory is not a
sovereign state).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 895D cmts. a, b, d, g; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Special Note on Governmental Immunity, chapter
45A) (1977); Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 106-07 (Minn. 1991); Elwood v. County
of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1988) (protecting public officials from fear of
personal liability allows for uninhibited exercise of discretion in performing their
duties); Cloud, supra note 12, at 562 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565
(1959) (protecting "responsible" officials would allow them to "carry out their duties with vigor, confidence, and decisiveness")); Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221,
226, 274 N.W. 165, 168 (1937) (concluding that without official immunity, "only
persons without property and without ambition to acquire any would suffer themselves to become.. .officers"). Official immunity protects actions "exercised on an
operational rather than a policymaking level, and it requires something more than
the performance of 'ministerial' duties." Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40
(Minn. 1992). Determining which acts are discretionary (immune from suit), and
which are ministerial (not immune) is sometimes difficult. Larson v. Independent
Sch. Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 1979) (noting the "distinction has
been subject to enigmatic application and occasional breakdown"). See also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1056 (5th ed.
1984) (noting much commentary indicates "[t]he division between those tortious
acts that import immunity and those that import liability has been a very difficult
one to mark...."). Official immunity protects officials "at the summaryjudgment
level" unless "there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether law enforcement acted maliciously." Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 372, 37677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Leonzal v. Grogan, 516 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994) (granting summary judgment)); Lommen v. City of East Grand
Forks, 522 N.W.2d 148, 149 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (granting summary judgment); Gasparre v. City of St. Paul, 501 N.W.2d 683, 685, 687 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (denying summary judgment); Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 7778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (denying summaryjudgment).
14. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 679; accord Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247
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cious wrong is a "willful violation of a known right."15 If an official
intentionally commits an act which he then has reason to believe is6
prohibited, official immunity is defeated, and the official is liable.1
"[This] standard contemplates less of a subjective inquiry into malice, which was traditionally favored at common law, and more of an
objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an official's actions." 7
Since Cook v. Trovatten,'8 a 1937 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a public official is automatically entitled to official immunity when his lawful duties require the
exercise of judgment or discretion.' 9 Specifically, police officers'
N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976); Wilbrecht v. Babcock, 179 Minn. 263, 264-65, 228 N.W.
916, 916 (1930); Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N.W.
435, 436 (1925); see also infranote 81. The federal standard for qualified immunity
(objective reasonableness) does not pertain to official immunity in state law
claims. Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 104; Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677 (noting that qualified
immunity under § 1983 "continues to evolve" separate from common law's official
immunity); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990) (distinguishing
official immunity for state law claims from qualified immunity for § 1983 claims);
see generally Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999) (applying an objective reasonableness standard-whether the right was clearly established at time of the violation-determines whether official is immune under qualified immunity); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that the objective
reasonableness standard applies to excessive force claims); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining that if "[t]he contours of the right... [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right...," qualified immunity does not protect him).
15. Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107 (defining malice or willfulness as an intentional
act the official "then has reason to believe is prohibited"); accord Carmes v. St. Paul
Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 462, 205 N.W. 630, 631 (1925) (defining
malice as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse, or,... the willful violation of a known right" and noting that spite or ill will are
"immaterial"). The malice standard for official immunity is not a subjective inquiry but considers instead "whether the official has intentionally committed an
act that he or she had reason to believe is prohibited." Beaulieu v. City of Mounds
View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994).
16. Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107.
17. Beaulieu, 518 N.W.2d at 571.
18. 200 Minn. 225, 226, 274 N.W. 2d 165, 167-68 (1937) (affirming the demurrer for the Commissioner of Agriculture and Dairy and Food because whether
to prosecute wholesale dealer for doing business without a license involves discretion and holding "that liability of a public officer for nonfeasance attaches only
'when the duty is ministerial...." (citing Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161
Minn. 345, 348, 201 N.W. 435, 436 (1925)).
19. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677; MINN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3(b) (1998) (providing that state employees are not liable for "loss caused by the performance or failure to perform a discretionary duty, whether or not the discretion is abused"); accord Morris, 453 N.W.2d at 41; Larson, 289 N.W.2d at 119 (quoting Susla, 311 Minn.
at 175, 247 N.W.2d at 912); Johnson v. Steele County, 240 Minn. 154, 164, 60
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duties, including preventing crimes and enforcing the law, involve
Furthermore, the court has broadly
the exercise of discretion.
construed "official immunity to apply to any claim against public
officials involving personal liability 'for damages."' 21 Thus, as applied to police, the court has consistently held that official immunity shields police officers from liability even if officers take inten2
tional action that could support an intentional tort claim.
N.W.2d 32, 39-40 (1953) (affirming demurrer for county employee because
"[p]ublic officials and employees are not held personally liable for acts done honestly in the exercise of the discretion which the law gives them."); Wilbrecht, 179
Minn. at 264, 228 N.W. at 916 (dismissing action against State Commissioner of
Highways because "[t]he Legislature did not specify the grade nor... [specify details] but left all such matters to be determined by the commissioner."). Before
1976, sovereign immunity generally prevented suit against the state of Minnesota.
Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn. 1988). In 1975, Nieting changed the general rule of immunity to one of liability. Nieting v. Blondell,
306 Minn. 122, 128, 235 N.W.2d 597, 601 (1975); see Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718.
The court did not abolish official immunity, however. Nieting, 306 Minn. at 131,
235 N.W.2d at 603. Official immunity shields a public official even though the discretionary actions are taken "on an operational rather than a policymaking level."
Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 40; see generally Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718-22 (distinguishing discretionary immunity from official immunity). Both discretionary immunity,
which "rests on the need to protect policymaking activities that involve a balancing
of social, political or economic considerations," and official immunity involve discretion, but discretion "has a broader meaning in the context of official immunity." Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678. Because discretionary immunity and official
immunity are separate doctrines, analyses under the two doctrines differ. Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 233 n.1 (Minn. 1988) (noting it is "analytically unsound to equate" official immunity with discretionary immunity). Whether the
officer's acts are discretionary or ministerial is a question of law. Kelly v. City of
Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 664 n.5 (Minn. 1999); Carradine v. State, 494
N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 511 N.W.2d 733
(Minn. 1994). Whether the officer's acts deserve immunity turns on the facts of
the case. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678; infra note 54 and accompanying text.
20. Cook, 200 Minn. at 224, 274 N.W. at 167 (explaining police duties are
general and executive in character, unlike ministerial duties, which are "absolute,
certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from
fixed and designated facts.... (quoting People v. May, 251 Ill. 54, 54, 95 N.E. 999,
101 (1911)); accord Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 40; Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678; Kelly v.
City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
"[t] he usual duties of police officers are not purely 'ministerial'.....).
21. Beaulieu, 518 N.W.2d at 570-71 (holding that official immunity shields an
officer from liability for a claim of discrimination brought under the Human
Rights Act, a statutory cause of action, as well as common law claims).
22. Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
immunity for state tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 102-106 (finding immunity for official who
fired former employee, even if official intentionally committed an act later determined to be wrong); Morris,453 N.W.2d at 42 (finding immunity for shooting out
tires and handcuffing man who evaded arrest even though same actions would
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C. IntentionalInfliction Of EmotionalDistress(lIED)
As recently as 1934, the law did not allow recovery for emotional distress independent from physical harm, even if it was intentionally inflicted." In 1936, however, Harvard Law Professor Cal-

vert Magruder proposed an emerging principle: that recovery for
severe "mental distress purposely caused is actionable unless justified.... 2 4 Thus, in the 1948 revision of the Restatement of Torts,
the Restatement first recognized an independent tort based on
IIED. 25 Since then, most jurisdictions have followed the Restatement's guidelines in widely recognizing the tort.26

otherwise be battery); Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 674 (finding immunity on claims of
battery and trespass). But see 423 N.W.2d at 679 (concluding that official immunity "protects honest law enforcement efforts, and is not intended to shield police
brutality.").
23. David Crump, EvaluatingIndependent Torts Based Upon "Intentional"or "Negligent" Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the
Bath Water?, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 439, 447 (1992) (noting that the law from 1861 to
1934 or so, depending on the jurisdiction was that "[m]ental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone..." (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598
(1861))); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. R. 874, 874 (1939) (noting that "the law has been reluctant, and very slow
indeed" to recognize emotional distress but that more than a hundred decisions
from 1919 to 1939 allowed recovery).
24. Calvert Magruder, Mental and EmotionalDisturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936); Crump, supra note 23, at 447 (noting that Professor Magruder and others recognized that society needed a way to deter severe
emotional distress "incident to participation in a community life" (citing Magruder, supra, at 1035)).
25. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934 & Supp. 1948) (stating that " [o] ne who,
without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable...for such emotional distress."); see also DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T.
HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL AccOuNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 488 n.1 (1997).
The drafters of the Restatement (Sec-

ond) (1965) replaced the "without a privilege" approach with the "outrageous"
limitation and added that a claim could be based on recklessness. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977); Crump, supra note 23, at 449.
26. Crump, supra note 23, at 446; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.
b (1977); infra note 30 and accompanying text; see generallyAlcom v. Anbro Eng'g.,
Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970) (noting California has "long recognized"
lIED); Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (Minn. 1926) (holding that the
complaint stated a cause of action, independent of assault or slander); LaBrier v.
Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Miss. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a
prima facie case of IIED was met); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961)
(holding complaint stated cause of action for IIED even though no other tort was
alleged). See also Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits
of Evenhandedness:Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distressby Outrageous Conduc 82
COLUM. L. REv. 42, n.9 (1982) (listing jurisdictions that have adopted the Re-
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Pre-1983, Minnesota allowed recovery for emotional distress
claims in egregious situations where the plaintiff was not threatened physically but suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant's intentional action. 27 Then, in the Hubbard8 decision in

1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted IIED as a separate
and independent tort. 9 The Hubbard court established four elements that the plaintiff must prove to recover: extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly
inflicted, which causes
31
emotional distress, which is severe.
Neither physical injury nor
statement (Second) formulation and those that recognize the tort but have not
adopted the Restatement).
27. Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of EmotionalDistress Claims in Minnesota,
19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 28 (1993); see generallyJohnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn.
203, 204, 208 N.W. 814, 815-16 (1926) (allowing recovery where school officials
accused schoolgirl of unchastity and threatened to imprison her); Lesch v. Great
N. Ry. Co., 97 Minn. 503, 505, 106 N.W. 955, 956 (1906) (allowing recovery when
defendant's employees, without asking for permission, entered and inventoried
the plaintiffs yard and home in her presence). But see Shuch v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 96 F. Supp. 400, 400, 403 (D. Minn. 1950) (concluding no recovery where defendant allegedly terminated plaintiff's employment in a way to deprive him of his benefits); Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property and
Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979) (holding no recovery for insurer's refusal to pay plaintiffs' claim because insurer's "motive in breaching [the] contract
does not convert ... the action into a tort action"). The policy rationale for not
recognizing emotional distress as an independent tort or for limiting the recovery
for emotional distress claims is the "potential for abuse of the judicial process" because "mental anguish is speculative" and is therefore "likely to lead to fictitious
allegations." Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn.
1983); Sampson, 167 Minn. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816 (noting possibility of "trumpedup claims").
28. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 428 (Minn. 1983).
29. Id. at 438. The adoption of lIED did not expand the right to recover for
emotional distress independent of physical injury. Id. at 439. In fact, because of
the extreme nature of the conduct and the degree of distress necessary to recover
under IIED, the scope of this cause of action is quite narrow. Steenson, supra note
27, at 36-37.
30. Extreme and outrageous means "so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community." Hubbard,330
N.W.2d at 439 (quoting Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 n.3); accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

Or TORTS

§ 46 cmt. d (1977) (noting that extreme and outrageous con-

duct "would arouse... resentment against the actor, and lead [an average member
of the community] to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'").
31. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438-39; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46(1) (1977) (defining IIED as "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm."). One acts intentionally when one "desires to cause consequences of his act, or [when] he believes that the consequences are substantially

certain to result from it."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/31

§ 8A (1977). See also
10

2000l

Peterson: Torts—Official Immunity Survives for IIED Police Misconduct: But
KELLY V. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS

1443

malice is required, and even verbal abuse, "under circumstances
32
peculiarly calculated to cause mental distress," is actionable.
III. THE KELLY DECISION
A.

The Facts33

Antoinette Deyo was hosting a party at her Minneapolis home
in the early morning hours of September 29, 1991 when Officer
Wells was dispatched to investigate a loud party at a neighboring
address.3 4

Outside at the scene, Wells met Deyo.3 5

Believing the

810 (6th ed. 1990) (defining intent as having the "desire
to bring about [a] result that will invade interests of another."). Reckless behavior
is "heedless" or "indifferent" conduct where the actor "pays no regard
to.. .probably or possibly injurious consequences" or where the actor "[foresees]
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

such consequences, [but] persists in spite of such knowledge." BLACK'S, supra, at
1270-71. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1977) (noting

that "reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either
with knowledge of.. .danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts
which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man."). Recklessness is characterized by an unreasonable, substantial, and probable risk of harm consciously
(and perhaps deliberately) disregarded. Id. Severe emotional distress is "so severe
that no reasonable... [person] could be expected to endure it." Hubbard, 330
N.W.2d at 439 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1977) (noting emotional distress includes "mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock" and "mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea," but liability exists only where distress
is extreme). Post-Hubbardrulings indicate no relaxation of these strenuous requirements. E.g.,Jensen v. Walsh, 609 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming that depression, anxiety, sleeping problems, inability to concentrate, chest
and intestinal stress, vomiting and headaches do not meet the legal standard of
severity); Langehaug v. Mary T., Inc., No. C4-98-1445, 1999 WL 31182, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that extreme and outrageous conduct must be more than merely offensive or inappropriate behavior);
Hanson v. Hackley, No. C7-98-1410, 1999 WL 43522, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2,
1999) (unpublished) (affirming trial court's determination that the jailers' refusal
to lend medical assistance to epileptic plaintiff "did not 'meet the high standard
necessary to sustain a claim .... '" under lIED); Cafferty v. Garcia's of Scottsdale,
Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that employment
discharge does not meet the level of distress required, even if the distress is exaggerated because of the plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility).
32. Prosser, supra note 23, at 881. Cf MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUcT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2.3(k), at 2-74 (2d ed. 1995) (noting even
if actionable as lIED, verbal abuse or harassment may "not constitute a violation of
constitutional rights" under Section 1983).
33. The parties disputed virtually every fact beyond these basics. Kelly v. City
of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. 1999); Kelly v. City of Minneapolis,
581 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
34. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Plaintiffs Deyo and Kelly are African American;
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noise came from Deyo's house, Wells attempted to write the uncooperative Deyo a citation.' 6 Wells struggled with Deyo to restrain
her, and Deyo fought back." When Deyo screamed that she was
18
being raped, Wells let go of her, and she ran into her house.
Wells, also believing that he was assaulted in the scuffle, called
for backups.3 9 Backup Officer Roiger and others went with Wells
into the house to arrest Deyo. 40 When Roiger tried to arrest Deyo,
Deyo's sister, Virginia Kelly, fought with him .
the officers are Caucasian males. Resp't Br. at 4. Officer Wells was dispatched to
investigate at 2932 Humboldt Ave. N. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo's address is
2934 Humboldt Ave. N. Id. Wells parked in the driveway that separates 2932 and
2934 Humboldt Ave. N. Resp't Br. at 4.
35. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo testified that she was sitting outside talking
to a friend when Wells arrived. Resp't Br. at 4. Deyo, observing that Wells looked
confused, approached him. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo indicated to Wells that
someone at 2932 was screaming, so obviously police were needed there, but instead of investigating the screams, Wells asked Deyo if she was aware of the city
noise ordinance. Resp't Br. at 4. Wells testified that when he told Deyo he was
investigating a noisy party, she told him she was hosting a party at her house.
Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. He seemed to think that she indicated that it was her
party he was looking for. Appellant Br. at 3.
36. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Specifically, Wells asked Deyo to come to his
squad car so he could give her a copy of the ordinance. Id. Because he could not
find a copy of the ordinance, he asked' for her name in case he needed it for further police action or prosecution. Appellant Br. at 3. When Deyo refused to give
him her name, he asked her to sit in the back seat of his car while he wrote her a
citation for violating the ordinance. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo sat in the car
but kept one foot on the pavement. Id. Wells tapped her calf with his hand and
told her to move her leg into the car. Id. Not understanding how she could be
arrested for violating a noise ordinance, Deyo attempted to get out of the car. Id.;
Resp't Br. at 5.
37. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo claimed that she asked if she could get out
to get her shoes and give keys to the friend with whom she was talking and that
Wells had said no. Resp't. Br. at 5. She testified that Wells then grabbed her
throat, twisted her arm, said, "I will put you out" (Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660), and
"called her a 'black bitch' and 'nigger bitch."' Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 375. Wells
claimed that when Deyo tried to get out of the car he grabbed her arm to restrain
her and put his hands on her shoulders to push her back into the car. Appellant
Br. at 4.
38. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Deyo testified that Wells' choke hold tore her
top, exposing her breasts, and almost caused her to pass out. Resp't Br. at 5. She
claimed her breasts were fully exposed when she ran into the house. Id. See also
Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660 (noting "there was disputed testimony as to whether or
not Deyo's breasts were exposed...."); cf Appellant Br. at 4, 17 (admitting that
Wells may have torn Deyo's top but that Deyo's breasts were not exposed during
her arrest and booking).
39. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660. Wells was bleeding from scratches to his neck
and ear. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 661. Deyo testified that Roiger, mistaking Virginia Kelly for Deyo,
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Kelly and Deyo sued officers Wells and Roiger "alleging a wide
variety of police misconduct including intentional infliction of
emotional distress." 42 The jury used a special verdict form and
found that Wells and Roiger were liable for the IED claim but
concluded that neither officer had acted with malice. 43 The trial
court held that because the officers had not acted with malice, official immunity shielded them from liability. 44 On appeal, the court
of appeals held that malice is inherent in a finding of IED and reversed the trial court's ruling.4
B.

The Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals

started to beat Kelly. Resp't. Br. at 7. Deyo testified that Roiger punched Kelly,
kneed her face, grabbed her hair, and struck her with force, tearing an earring
from her ear. Id. Wells testified that he described Deyo to the other officers.
Appellant Br. at 5. Roiger testified that the two women did not look alike although they were both wearing black, that he did not mistake Kelly for Deyo, and
that Kelly was hostile as the officers looked for Deyo. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 660-61.
When Roiger told Deyo that she was under arrest and tried to free her from her
brother's grip, Kelly attacked Roiger. Id. at 661. Roiger claimed that Kelly
grabbed his sweater near his throat, gouged at his eyes, cheeks, neck, and throat.
Appellant Br. at 6. At one point, when Kelly's head was near his crotch, Roiger
was allegedly afraid that Kelly was going to bite his penis. Id. To pull her face
away from his crotch, he grabbed Kelly by her hair. Id. at 7.
42. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 659-60. Plaintiffs also sued the Minneapolis Chief of
Police John Laux and the City of Minneapolis. Id. at 661. Besides IIED, plaintiffs
alleged false arrest and imprisonment, assault, battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, excessive force, wrongful entry, conspiracy to violate constitutional
rights, racial discrimination, and unreasonable delay of medical treatment. Id.
43. Id. at 662. The court gave the six-member jury "an 81-question special
verdict form, requiring findings as to whether each defendant had committed
each claimed offense and, if so, whether the offense had been committed with
malice." Id. at 661. It is not clear from the special verdict form what the jury's
finding of lIED was premised on. Id. at 663 (concluding that brawl and subsequent arrests likely formed basis for IIED). See also Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 666 (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (speculating that racial slurs and exposure of Deyo's breasts
formed basis for IIED); Resp't Br. at 20 (concluding that failure to take Kelly
promptly to a hospital could have formed the basis for IIED); Appellant Br. at 22
(suggesting that IIED could have been found because "two initially innocent parties" were severely harmed "as the result of a very minor complaint."). The jury
also found that the officers were not liable as to any other claim and that Deyo suffered $82,546 in damages attributable to Wells (for medical expenses, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings) and that Kelly suffered $85,220
in damages attributable to Roiger (for medical expenses, emotional distress, and
pain and suffering). Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 661-62; accord Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 37576.
44. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 662; Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 376.
45. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 662; Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 377, 379.
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46

and reinstated the trial court's decision. The supreme court held
that the court of appeals erred in vacating the jury's finding that
the appellants acted without malice when they caused emotional
distress, and that, in the absence of malice, official immunity
shields officials from liability when they perform discretionary duties.47 The court concluded that the jury could have believed the
officers committed the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
48
but acted without malice, under at least two theories.
IV. ANALYSIS

A.

The Majority Opinion

In pointing out the flaws in the court of appeals' opinion, the
supreme court offers several logical reasons to support its conclusion that this case presents no reason to limit either the applicability of official immunity or the elements of IIED.
First, the court of appeals bases its conclusion on the desire
not to protect police activity that exceeds the scope of authority
from liability.49 The court does not dispute that police misconduct,
when malicious, should not be immune from suit.50 The real bone
of contention here is that the court of appeals cannot fathom a

46. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 665.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 663. The court concluded either that the jury could have found
that Wells and Roiger acted recklessly instead of intentionally, which would prevent a finding of malice, or that the officers' behavior, although outrageous, was
justified under the circumstances and thus not malicious. Id. The dissent grants
that the court's conclusions may be "appropriate" if the jury findings were based
on the scuffles. Id. at 666. However, the dissent, characterizing the jury answers as
a compromised verdict, argues that the court's conclusion that the jury finding of
IIED was based on physical contact is inconsistent with jury findings that the officers did not commit assault or battery or use excessive force. Id. at 666-67. The
dissent speculates that the finding of IIED hinged on racial or sexist slurs or "the
exposure of... [Deyo's] breasts." Id.; infra note 44.
49. Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 378 (concluding that the officers' conduct "far exceed[ed] any 'discretionary conduct"'); Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 665 (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (arguing that official immunity should not protect the officers' actions
because they "clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretionary authority");
Baker v. Chaplin, 497 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that "official immunity is intended to protect bona fide law enforcement practices... not... police brutality."), affd and remanded by, Baker v. Chaplin, 517 N.W.2d
911, 916 (Minn. 1994); Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Minn.
1988) (noting that official immunity protects "honest law enforcement efforts,"
not "police brutality," which is synonymous with a willful or malicious wrong).
50. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 664.
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5
situation where police engage in IIED without
' The major... malice.
52
ity, however, presents two credible possibilities.
Second, the issue of whether an officer's actions were malicious or willful is generally a question of fact to be decided by the
jury. In this case, Kelly and Deyo produced sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers acted

maliciously. 5 4

Nonetheless, the jury concluded that neither Wells

nor Roiger acted with malice. 55 Because a finding of malice requires a finding of intentional conduct, it is probable that the jury
premised the IIED finding on reckless, rather than intentional, be56
havior.
Third, the actions of Wells and Roiger, though "repugnant"
and "unfortunate," are exactly the kinds of behavior from which official immunity protects officials from liability.57 Official immunity
51. Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 378 (holding that a finding of intentional infliction
of emotional distress "[a]lmost invariably.. .meets the definition of malice...." and
is thus the equivalent to police brutality). See also Appellant Br. at 11-12 (arguing
that the court of appeals' holding contradicts precedent); cf. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d
at 679 (explaining that malice is not to be presumed but is a question for the jury).
52. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 663. Infra notes 44, 49 and accompanying text. The
majority's theories are crucial because the jury verdict must be sustained if the
jury's answers can be reconciled. Swanson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 252 Minn.
484, 487, 90 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1958). Furthermore, a special verdict form "is to be
liberally construed" to reconcile jury answers. Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151,
155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967).
53. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 664 n.5; Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678 (recognizing that
applying official immunity "turns on the facts of each case."); Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at
376 (citing Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678); Carradine v. State, 494 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part (on other grounds), Carradine v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1994).
54. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 663. Testimony of a tense situation, officers' concern
for their own safety, and "the jury finding that the [officers] did not use excessive
force in making the arrests and that they reasonably believed that they had lawful
authority to do so..." support either the theory that Wells and Roiger acted recklessly or the theory that the officers were justified by acting outrageously under the
circumstances. Id.
55. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 662.
56. Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 377 (instructing the jury on IIED included intentional or reckless conduct) (emphasis added). Additionally, to support the alternative theory, the jury would have to justify the alleged sexist or racist name-calling
under the circumstances, if it was the basis for the jury's finding of IIED (and it
may be difficult for ajury to justify sexist or racist name-calling under any circumstance). Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 666; see also infra notes 49, 67, 74.
57. Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 376 (citing the trial court's memorandum of law). See
also Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 665 (arresting suspect does "not involve the 'fixed and
designated facts' and 'absolute, certain and imperative' duties of a ministerial
act."); Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) (noting "[i]t is difficult to
think of a situation where the exercise of significant, independent judgment and
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is practical and rational: "it allows police officers to perform an effective and efficient job with necessary force without being subject
to second guessing of their split-second decisions. 5 8 Other states
have reached identical conclusions.
Fourth, the logical extension of the court of appeals' holding
would prevent official immunity from shielding officers from liability on all intentional torts because they are premised on intent.60
Affirming the court of appeals' holding would drastically limit the
scope of official immunity afforded to police officers in particular,
because officers must make physical contact with citizens who could
then recover for any harmful or offensive bodily contact. 6 Thus,
limiting immunity to torts not based on intent, such as negligence
and some statutory causes of action, would wipe out significant protection from liability for the police.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, restricting immunity in

discretion would be more required...than the decision to chase a car."); Johnson
v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 42 (Minn. 1990) (tire-shooting, handcuffing, and pointing revolver with the threat to shoot is a "classic case" of the kind of discretion official immunity protects); Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 679 (deciding to enter the home
and detain suspects is "the kind ofjudgment meant to be protected..." and citing
as an example Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Mo. 1987) (harming bystanders while exchanging gunfire with man threatening others with rifle qualifies
for official immunity)).
58. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 667 (Gilbert,J., dissenting). See also Kelly, 598 N.W.2d
at 665 (concluding that "the conduct of police officers in responding to a dispatch
or making an arrest involves precisely the type of discretionary decisions, often
split-second and on meager information, that we intended to protect from judicial
second-guessing through the doctrine of official immunity."). Official immunity is
also practical and sensible because it allows latitude for mistakes to be made. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678. In emergency situations especially, police need broad
discretion "because a more stringent standard could inhibit action." Id.
59. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 679; C.L. v. Olson, 422 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Wis.
1998) (explaining policy considerations behind official immunity); Currie v. Lao,
592 N.E.2d 977, 984 (I11.
1992) (explaining that "a public decisionmaker should
not be subject to personal liability where he makes a decision based on his perception of the public needs."); Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865 (explaining that "fear of personal liability should not hang over public officials as they make judgments affecting the public safety and welfare."); Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 363 N.W.2d
641, 678-80 (Mich. 1984) (noting that police "must be given a wide degree of discretion in determining what type of action" should be taken).
60. BLACK'S, supra note 31, at 811 (defining intentional tort as "[a] tort in
which the actor is expressly or impliedlyjudged to have possessed intent or purpose to injure."); e.g., Morris, 453 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasizing that intent is one of
"two operative elements" of battery). Furthermore, previous decisions would have
been improperly decided. Appellant Br. at 10-11.
61. Morris, 453 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297
N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1990).
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this way would undermine the purpose of official immunity-to
protect officials from harassing suits and potential liability which
would "'unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public
officers in the discharge of their duties. '' 62 Because police are
called to use their best judgment to make snap decisions under
tense circumstances and are allowed to protect themselves from
harm, police officers need the protection that official immunity affords."
Therefore, because the jury did not find willful or malicious
conduct under the facts of the Kelly case, the majority concluded
that the officers are lawfully entitled to immunity. However, by allowing the jury to determine that the officer's conduct was reckless,
and not intentional, the court condones police misconduct because
juries more often than not favor the officer over the plaintiff.6
B.

The DissentingOpinion

The dissent
argues
....
65 that official immunity should not be applicable in this situation. The problem is that the law has created a
cause of action to compensate for unlawful emotional distress but,
because of a loophole, the plaintiffs do not recover. 66 Specifically,
the IIED's intentional or reckless element allows juries to exempt
officers from liability for causing bona fide severe emotional distress. Furthermore, the kind of police conduct that causes severe
emotional distress can only be characterized as "wholly inappropriate" and "irrelevant to the performance of the official duties of a
police officer" and deepens the distrust and animosity felt between
police and citizens.6 ' Therefore, even though official immunity "is
62. Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Holmquist v.
State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 233 n.I (Minn. 1988)); accord Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678;
Carradine v. State, 494 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
63. MINN. STAT. § 609.06, subd. 1(1,3)(1998) (authorizing public officers'
use of force); MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subd. 2(1) (1998) (authorizing peace officers'
use of deadly force).
64. Patton, supra note 5, at 764-65.
65. The dissent points out that "the court grants immunity for conduct that is
,utterly intolerable' and 'so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency."
Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 666 (Minn. 1999) (citing Haagenson
v. Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 n.3 (Minn. 1979)).
66. Recovery under IIED is already severely limited by stringent standards.
Infra notes 28, 30. Furthermore, in the context of police misconduct, some recovery under lIED may be desirable because it would promote social welfare. Supra
notes 11, 12, and 76 and accompanying text. But see Crump, supra note 23, at 446.
67. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 666, 668 (concluding that "[n]o officer could believe
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not intended to shield police brutality," official immunity does
shield police from liability for such conduct.9
The dissent presents three interpretations of the law that justify their conclusion. First, the dissent argues that in the context of
IED, recklessness means a knowing disregard. Thus, "calling an
individual derogatory
racist
r 1
,,69 and sexist names is intentional rather
than reckless [conduct] . Second, the kind of discretionary conduct that the officers engaged in here-the name-calling and exposure-is not the kind of discretionary conduct official immunity is
meant to protect.70 This theory amounts to a threshold question:
himself to be legally justified in calling a suspect such derogatory racist and sexist
names[,]" and "name-calling and demeaning actions in an already tense situation
can only serve to escalate the existing conflict."); City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 89, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 (1976) (concluding that the word
"nigger' has no place in the civil treatment of a citizen by a public official.").
68. Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Minn. 1988).
69. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 666; cf Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 372,
377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing jury instruction No. 40: "Intentionally means
that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing, or cause the result specified or
believes that this act, if successful, will cause that result."); 4A MICHAEL K. STEENSON

&

PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUcTION GUIDES: CIVIL 4

(1999) (in-

structing that "' [i]ntent' or 'intentionally' means that a person: 1. Wants to cause
the consequences of his or her acts, or 2. Knows that his or her acts are substantially certain to cause those consequences."); Crump, supra note 23, at 494 (arguing that states "should define recklessness in a manner that embodies an intentional disregard of the victim's interests" and that cases construing the reckless
disregard standard for libel are precedent for this proposition). Redefining "reckless" would make it more difficult for officers to escape liability in situations like
this. However, defining recklessness in this way would expand recovery under
IED instead of limit it, and courts have been concerned with limiting recovery
under lIED since its inception. Id. at 446, 449.
70. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 667-68 (concluding that "such conduct.. .should
never be condoned as 'discretionary conduct' shielded by official immunity.").
Thus, under this theory, discretion for the purposes of official immunity is divided
into two arenas: for conduct taken within the scope of one's official duties, which
would be immune, and conduct that lies outside the scope of one's official duties,
which would not be immune. Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 984 (Ill. 1992) (holding that deciding when to turn vehicle was not a discretionary act because it "was
an activity of a non-official nature."); Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dis. No. 314, 289
N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 1979) (noting that "using judgment does not establish
that [the actor] is performing a discretionary duty."); C.L. v. Olson, 422 N.W.2d
614, 620 (Wis. 1988) (noting that immunity does not attach "where a public officer's challenged decision involves the exercise of discretion but the discretion exercised is not governmental, i.e. does not require the application of statutes to
facts nor a subjective evaluation of the law."). Cf Jennifer D. Brandt, Note, The
Plague of Medical Malpractice in Public Hospitals-Texas Adopts a New Standardfor Determining Whether a Doctor Has Official Immunity, 26 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 959, 960-61,
974-75, 979-80 (1995) (describing "governmental" discretion, for which there
would be immunity, and "medical" discretion, for which there would not); Nelson
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Does the conduct at issue fall within the scope of official immunity?7 The dissent suggests that because the officer's conduct is
72
not integral to his duties, official immunity would not apply.
Third, the malice standard of official immunity approximates the
objective reasonableness standard of qualified immunity where the
particulars of the case come into the analysis.73 Under this standard, the court could conclude that, by definition, "[a]n officer's
conduct involving racial and gender bias, is by its very nature, malicious conduct" because "[t] here can be no doubt that a police officer knows that the use of racist and sexist names and the exposure
of a suspect's breasts throughout transport and booking are prohibited." 4 Thus, the dissent would interpret existing law to find liv. Babcock, 188 Minn. 584, 585, 248 N.W. 49, 51 (1933) (concluding that if the
officer's act exceeds his authority, he can be held liable). Such an analysis would
be difficult in the context of police conduct ("governmental" v. "personal" discretion?) and would drastically limit the scope of official immunity's coverage, undermining the policy rationale for the doctrine.
71.
Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 667 (noting that "our traditional official immunity
analysis" starts with the "identification of 'the precise governmental conduct at issue'.") (citing Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d
216, 219 (Minn. 1998)).
72. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 668 (concluding that the officers' conduct was
"wholly inappropriate" and "irrelevant").
73. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (explaining that whether
force is reasonable depends on all "the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.") But see Patton, supra note
5, at 759 (arguing that the standard in excessive force cases should be whether the
force used was justified and necessary not whether it was objectively reasonable
under the circumstances).
74. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 667-68. 5 MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, CODE OF
CONDUCT AND USE OF FORCE §§ 5-104, Nos. 9, 13, 14, and 5-106, No. 3(1988). The
Code states explicitly that:
9. [Officers] shall not use indecent, profane or unnecessarily harsh language in the performance of official duties or in the presence of the public.
13. [Officers] shall not use derogatory language or actions which are intended to embarrass, humiliate, or shame a person, or do anything intended to incite another to violence.
14. [Officers] shall be decorous in their language and conduct. They
shall refrain from actions or words that bring discredit to the Department. They shall also not use words or terms which hold any person,
group or organization up to contempt. The use of such unacceptable
terms is strictly forbidden....
3. No [officer] shall willfully mistreat or give inhumane treatment to any
person held in custody.
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ability.
Even though the dissent's outcome is desirable, relying on the
law as it stands is not the answer to the problem of police misconduct.7 5 If official immunity should not shield officers from liability
for police misconduct and racial or sexist slurs directed toward a
citizen by an officer, or the exposure of a citizen's breasts, qualifies
as outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress that no
person should have to endure, then whether the acts at issue were
intentionally or recklessly caused is not the right question. 76
Therefore, in the context of police misconduct, where the law
allows officials to be immune from liability when they cause citizens
severe emotional distress, the court should not uphold the law.77 If
75. The court of appeals and the dissent both conclude that official immunity
should not apply, albeit for different reasons. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 667-68 (concluding that "official immunity is not applicable" when lIED results from "namecalling and exposure"); Kelly, 581 N.W.2d at 377-78 (concluding that "a finding of
intentional infliction of emotional distress necessarily must lead to a finding of
malice"). The dissent also concludes that this case should be remanded for a new
trial because "[t]he starting point for analysis of an immunity question is identification of the precise governmental conduct at issue...," and there was no clear
identification of the conduct which resulted in the IIED claim. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d
at 667-68 (quoting Gleason, 582 N.W.2d at 219 (citing Watson ex rel Hanson v.
Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. 1996))). See also
Cohen, supra note 4, at 180 (noting that the law is an ineffective source for police
authority because of oppression under the law); supra note 69 and accompanying
tex176. It is not the right question because this question allows an inherently biased jury to ignore the pertinent question-whether or not the officer's conduct
wasjustified. Patton, supranote 5 at 773 (noting that the public's main concern is
to be protected from criminals); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Force of Law: Federal Lawsuitsfor Rodney King Raise New Issues, 78 A.B.A. J., July 1992 at 76, 77 (noting that
"[a] need for law and order can weigh heavily on juries' minds, tipping the balance in favor of defendants...." by stretching the law); see also infra note 79. Cf
Patton, supra note 5, at 759 (arguing that the correct standard would ask whether
the conduct was "justified and necessary").
Furthermore, given that juries favor officers, the implicit message that a
jury could find malice in police conduct will not deter police misconduct. Rob
Yale, Note, Searchingfor the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1841,
1842 (1997) (noting a direct correlation between lack of punishment and the attitude of police "that they can commit acts of brutality unchecked"); Crump, supra
note 23, at 446 (explaining that requiring officers to pay damages incurred by
their behavior will deter their undesirable conduct); see generally RicHARD A. PosNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW, ch. 6 (3d ed. 1986). Because lIED intends to
redress "outrageous conduct, of a kind especially calculated to cause serious mental and emotional disturbance," the recovery should not hinge on whether the
conduct was recklessly or intentionally caused. Prosser, supra note 23, at 879.
77. In balancing the competing interests of legitimate police practices and
freedom from severe emotional distress caused by the police, courts need to take
into account "that the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action falls disproportionately on African-American[s]...." Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181,
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incidents of police misconduct will be affected by liability, a different standard for police misconduct cases would enable juries to distinguish between conduct that should be immune and conduct that
should not." An appropriate standard would analyze whether the
officer's conduct was privileged. 9 The dissent hints at this possibil1187 (9th Cir. 1996); Freeman, supra note 4, at 680, 684 (arguing that "it is
equally important to ensure that justice is done when prevention fails...." and
concluding that "how we deal with [police brutality].. .speak[s] volumes about our
commitment to overcoming.. .deep societal chasms"). While this Note addresses
only one kind of official, the police officer, there is no reason that the standard
proposed should be limited just to the police. This standard could extend to all
public officials who are authorized to use force. MINN. STAT. § 609.06 (1), (6), (7),
(8), (9) and (10) (2000) (authorizing public officers, teachers, lawful custodians of
children or pupils, school employees or school bus drivers, common carriers,
those who have the authority over the mentally ill or mentally defective, and public or private institutions that provide custody or treatment to use reasonable
force).
78. Crump, supra note 23, at 446 (noting that "requiring actors in a market
system to pay the costs they externalize .... [discourages] their dysfunctional conduct"); see also supranote 77. But see Givelber, supra note 26, at 62 (noting that the
original "privilege formulation" focused "on the policy question of whether the
defendant's ends justified his or her means...," a difficult task, and the outrageousness test allows courts and juries to avoid this question).
79. Privilege is an appropriate standard because it recognizes that "there are
many socially desirable human activities of which the intentional causing of emotional distress is an essential part." Crump, supra note 23, at 448. This standard
appreciates that the police may legitimately need to cause emotional distress.
Privilege would be based on the importance of and need for officers' discretionary
acts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10(2) (b) (1965) (explaining that privilege
can be based on "the fact that its exercise is necessary for the protection of some
interest of the actor or of the public which is of such importance as to justify the
harm caused or threatened by its exercise...."). The privilege would be conditional, protecting the officer from liability, only if the acts are "done for the purpose of protecting or advancing the interest in question." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 10 cmt. d (1965). If the officer acted "for any purpose other than the
protection or advancement of the interest in question...," the privilege would be
destroyed. Id. To disprove privilege, a plaintiff would have to show that the officer's conduct was not justified and necessary or was forbidden. Id. at cmt. c (noting that privilege would be an affirmative defense for the defendant). Thus, under this proposal, the "intentionally or recklessly inflicted" element of IIED would
change to "intentionally inflicted or recklessly inflicted without privilege." Supra
text accompanying note 32. Cf AvERY& RUDOVSK, supra note 32, § 13.3(d), at 137 (setting out jury instructions for unreasonable force: "An officer is entitled to use
such force as a reasonable person would think is required to take one arrested into
custody... .However, an officer is not allowed to use any force beyond that reasonably necessary to accomplish his lawful purpose."). Because privileged conduct
is legally reasonable, conduct that is not privileged would come under the malice
exception to official immunity. Supra note 16 and accompanying text. Thus, officers engaging in either intentional or reckless, but unprivileged behavior, would
not escape liability.
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ity when it says that "[a] finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress is implicitly void of any legal justification, as legally
justified behavior
is always tolerable under the circumstances that
80
it."
justify
V.

CONCLUSION

There is nothing wrong with the Kelly decision on its face. The
court does not change the scope of protection official immunity affords police whose duties require discretion or the elements to
make out a prima facie case of IIED. Specifically, the Kelly decision
upholds Hubbardby affirming the elements of IIED, including reckless, in lieu of intentional, conduct. Furthermore, Kelly, in upholding Cook and its progeny, affirms the malice exception to official
immunity. Thus, plaintiffs suing an official may recover if the official exercises a ministerial duty or acts with malice while performing a discretionary duty.8' In the absence of malice, the Kelly decision also makes clear that official immunity will act as a bar to
recovery for intentional torts, including IIED, because officers need
latitude in exercising discretionary activities.
There is something very wrong about the Kelly decision, however. Given the opportunity to address police misconduct, the
court neither interprets "recklessness," "discretionary activities," or
"malice" in a way that would allow for recovery nor adopts a different standard for liability for IIED police misconduct. Rather, in
excusing a legitimate case of police misconduct, the court does society a distinct disservice. One can only hope that police will not
understand the Kelly decision as a license to abuse citizens because
official immunity automatically extends to all their discretionary
acts but, instead, will be deterred from misconduct because a jury
could find malice in their conduct.82

80. Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 664 (noting two exceptions to official immunity: ministerial duty and malice); supranotes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
81. Of course, plaintiffs would also have to make out a prima facie case under
the tort's elements to recover. Supra notes 14, 15.
82. The Kelly decision may be included in the police training manual but
likely only as a footnote because Kelly did not change the law and because excessive force claims make up the main body of litigation so the manual focuses on use
of force, not emotional distress. Telephone Interview with Timothy Skarda, Assistant Minneapolis City Attorney (Aug. 8, 2000).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/31

22

